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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Krystal Easley timely appeals from the district court's order revoking probation. 
On appeal, Ms. Easley argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied her due process 
and equal protection when it refused to augment the record with various transcripts she 
requested to be created at the public's expense. Ms. Easley also argues that the 
practice in the 5th Judicial District, which allows the prosecutor to prevent a district court 
from considering a defendant as a candidate for mental health court, violates Idaho's 
separation of powers doctrine and Idaho's requirement that all judicial powers and 
practices be uniform throughout the State. Both of these issues appear to ones of first 
impression. Additionally, Ms. Easley argues that the district court abused its discretion 
when it revoked her probation and failed to further reduce the length of her sentence 
sua sponte. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In docket number 39710 (hereinafter, First Case), Ms. Easley was charged, by 
Information, with possession of a controlled substance. (R., pp.33-34.) Pursuant to a 
plea agreement, Ms. Easley entered an Aflord1 plea to possession of a controlled 
substance. (R., pp.79-81; 10/17/05 Tr., p.8, L.19 - p.9, L.13, p.11, L.11 - p.13, L.10.) 
Thereafter, the district court imposed a unified sentence of four years, with two years 
fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed Ms. Easley on probation. (R., pp.78-86.) 
After a period of probation, the State filed a report of probation violation wherein 
it alleged that Ms. Easley violated various terms of her probation. (R., pp.97-99.) 
1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
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Ms. Easley admitted to violating the terms of her probation for failing to stay in contact 
with her probation officer, absconding, failing to maintain employment, and failing to pay 
costs of supervision. (R., pp.97-98, 111.) The district court then revoked probation, but 
decided to reinstate probation. (R., pp.113-117.) 
After a second period of probation, the State filed a motion to revoke probation 
wherein it alleged that Ms. Easley violated various terms of her probation. (R., pp.148-
150.) Based on some of the allegations contained in the motion to revoke probation, 
the State, in docket number 39711 (hereinafter, Second Case), filed an Information 
charging Ms. Easley with possession of a controlled substance. (R., pp.327-328.) At a 
consolidated hearing,2 Ms. Easley pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled 
substance in the Second Case. (07/12/10 Tr., p.9, L.3 - p.11, L.12, p.12, L.17 - p.19, 
LA.) Ms. Easley also admitted to violating the terms of her probation for changing 
residence without permission, consuming methamphetamine, possessing 
methamphetamine, having prohibited contact with Charles Voorhees, and failing to pay 
costs of supervision. (R., p.149.) In the First Case, the district court revoked probation, 
but retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.195-199.) In the Second Case, the district court 
imposed a concurrent unified sentence of seven years, with three years fixed, but 
retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.366-372.) Upon review of Ms. Easley's period of retained 
jurisdiction (hereinafter, rider), the district court suspended the sentences and placed 
Ms. Easley on probation in both cases. (R., pp.203-208, 379-383.) 
After a period of probation, the State filed a motion to revoke probation in both 
cases alleging that Ms. Easley violated the terms of her probation agreements.3 
2 From this point forward, both cases were treated as if they were formally consolidated. 
3 The motion to revoke probation in the Second case contained the same allegations as 
the motion to revoke in the first case. (R., pp.214-216, 391-394.) However, the motion 
2 
(R., pp.214-216, 391-394.) Ms. Easley admitted to violating the terms of her probation 
agreements for failing to obtain a substance use evaluation, failing to provide a drug 
test, changing her residence without permission, failing to make herself available for 
supervision, failing to report to her probation officer, and failing to complete community 
service. (11/15/11 Tr., p.8, L.6 - p.11, L.5.) The State then filed a second motion to 
revoke probation in both cases alleging that Ms. Easley violated the terms of her 
probation agreements. (R., pp.241-242, 432-433.) 
Prior to the probation violation disposition hearing, Ms. Easley sent a letter to the 
Twin Falls mental health court coordinator, who determined she would be a good 
candidate for mental health court. (01/31/12 Tr., p.38, LS.12 - p.39, L.1.) However, the 
prosecutor did not agree with the recommendation. (01/31/12 Tr., p.39, Ls.5-10.) The 
district court recognized that Ms. Easley was a good candidate for mental health court, 
but decided that it did not have the ability to place her into that program because of a 
practice in Twin Falls County which provides the prosecutor with an absolute veto 
power over all mental health court eligibility decisions. (01/31/12 Tr., pA7, L.23 - pA8, 
L.25.) Thereafter, the district court revoked probation in both cases and executed the 
underlying sentences. (R., pp.266-269, 457-461.) However, the district court sua 
sponte reduced her sentence in the Second to Case to a unified sentence of seven 
years, with two years and six months fixed. (R., ppA57-461.) The district court made 
the following statement after it reduced Ms. Easley's sentence sua sponte, "I do that, 
not because people who abscond probation deserve a break, but I do believe there is a 
significant question about your mental health to offer you an opportunity to hopefully get 
in the Second case contained an additional allegation not alleged in the first case. 
(R., pp.214-216, 391-394.) 
3 
some treatment in the therapeutic community or otherwise and have an opportunity to 
parole out a half a year sooner." (01/31/12 Tr., p.50, Ls.5-16.) Ms. Easley timely 
appealed in both cases. (R., pp.271-274, 462-465.) 
On appeal, Ms. Easley filed a motion to augment the record with various 
transcripts. (Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement 
in Support Thereof (hereinafter, Motion to Augment), pp.1-4.) The State objected in part 
to Ms. Easley's request for the transcripts. (Objection in Part to "Motion to Augment and 
to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof" (hereinafter, 
Objection to Motion to Augment), pp.1-4.) Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme Court entered 
an order granting Ms. Easley's request for two transcripts, but denying her request for 
transcripts of the admit/deny hearing, held on September 17, 2007, the disposition 
hearing, held on October 29, 2007, and the rider review hearing, held on February 22, 
2011. (Order (hereinafter, Order Denying Motion to Augment), pp.1-2.) 
4 
ISSUES 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Ms. Easley due process and equal protection 
when it denied her Motion to Augment with the requested transcripts? 
2. Does the Fifth Judicial District's practice, which allows the prosecutor to prevent 
a district court from considering the placement of a defendant into mental health 
court violate Idaho's separation of powers doctrine? 
3. Does the Fifth Judicial District's practice, which allows the prosecutor to prevent 
a district court from considering a defendant as a candidate for mental health 
court violate the constitutional requirement that all courts of the same class have 
uniform judicial powers, procedures, and practices? 
4. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Ms. Easley's probation? 
5. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to further reduce 




The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Ms. Easley Due Process And Equal Protection When 
It Denied Her Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With Necessary Transcripts 
A. Introduction 
A long line of United States Supreme Court cases hold that it is a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses to deny an indigent 
defendant access to transcripts of proceedings which are relevant to issues the 
defendant intends to raise on appeal. In the event the record reflects a colorable need 
for a transcript, the only way a court can constitutionally preclude an indigent defendant 
from obtaining that transcript is if the State can prove that the transcript is irrelevant to 
the issues raised on appeal. 
In this case, Ms. Easley filed a Motion to Augment, requesting various 
transcripts. The request for the transcripts of the admit/deny hearing, held on 
September 17, 2007, the disposition hearing, held on October 29, 2007, and the rider 
review hearing, held on February 22, 2011, were denied by the Supreme Court. On 
appeal, Ms. Easley is challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of her request for 
the transcripts. Ms. Easley asserts that the requested transcripts are relevant to the 
issues of whether the district court abused its discretion in revoking probation, and 
whether it abused its discretion by failing to further reduce the length of her sentence 
sua sponte because the applicable standard of review requires an appellate court to 
conduct an independent review the entire proceedings in order to evaluate the district 
court's sentencing/probationary decisions. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court erred in 
denying her request. 
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B. The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Ms. Easley Due Process And Equal Protection 
When It Denied Her Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With The 
Necessary Transcripts 
1. The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Ms. Easley With Access 
To The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Her Due Process And Equal 
Protection Because She Cannot Obtain A Merit Based Appellate Review 
Of Her Sentencing Claims 
The constitutions of both the Idaho Const. United States and the State of Idaho 
guarantee a criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Idaho 
Const. art. I § 13. 
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); 
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts 
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due 
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." 
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servo of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24 
(1981). Const. 
State V. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State V. Wood, 
132 Idaho 88 (1998)). The Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United States 
Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United States 
Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh V. State, Dept. of 
Health and Welfare ex reI. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221, 227 (1998). 
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. See 
I.C. § 19-2801. Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a transcript, 
the transcript must be created at county expense. I.C. § 1-1105(2); I.C. § 19-863(a). 
Idaho court rules also address this issue. Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2 mandates the 
production of transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant. I.C.R. 5.2(a). 
Further, "[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding before the court .. 
. . " Id. Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to "order a transcript to 
7 
be prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from paying such a fee as 
provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.7(a). 
An appeal from an order revoking probation is an appeal of right as defined in 
Idaho Appellate Rule 11. An order revoking probation is an order "made after judgment 
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant." State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852 
(Ct. App. 1983). 
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of cases that directly 
address whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can 
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the 
relevant trial proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these 
cases. The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal 
protection clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent 
defendants and those with financial means is not tolerated. However, the second 
theme limits the states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for 
review. The states do not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they 
request. In order to meet the constitutional mandates of due process and equal 
protection, the states must provide indigent defendants with an appellate record unless 
some or all of the requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous. 
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a 
certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript of the 
proceedings, be furnished [to] them without cost." Griffin, 351 at 13. At that time, the 
State of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been 
sentenced to death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase 
8 
transcripts themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme 
Court was whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty 
defendants was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16. 
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich, 
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due 
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with 
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of 
justice in every American court.'" Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty 
than on account of religion, race, or color." Id. The Supreme Court went on to hold as 
follows: 
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the 
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which 
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all 
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a 
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate 
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a 
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that 
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their 
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois 
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant. 
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious 
discriminations. 
Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted). In order to satisfy the constitutional 
mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be 
provided with a record which facilitates an effective merits-related appellate review. At 
the same time, the Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary 
in instances where a less expensive, yet adequate, alternative exists. Id. at 20. 
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In Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding 
in Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court 
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency. In 
that case, the State argued that the defendant had already received appellate review of 
his conviction by the Ohio appellate court. Burns, 360 U.S. at 257. The United States 
Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled that "once the State chooses to 
establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access 
to any phase of that procedure because of their poverty." Id. "This principle is no less 
applicable where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase 
of its appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of 
that procedure solely because of his indigency." Id. 
In State v. Draper, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a 
procedure determining access to transcripts based on a frivolousness standard. "Under 
the present standard, ... they must convince the trial judge that their contentions of 
error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary to prosecute their 
appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. 494. The Supreme Court first expanded upon its statement 
in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent alternative is 
available, by adding a relevancy requirement when stating that "part or all of the 
stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the 
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such 
circumstances." Id. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised for 
appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts. The 
Court ultimately concluded that the issues raised by the defendants could not be 
10 
adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial 
proceedings. Id. at 497-99. 
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), extended the Griffin protections 
to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to 
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on 
appeal. In doing so, it was held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument 
that he/she needs items to create a complete record on appeal. Id. at 195. If the State 
wants to deny the defendant's request, it is the State's burden to prove that the 
requested items are not necessary for the appeal. Id. 
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the 
Idaho Court of Appeals. See Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v. 
Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App. 
2007). 
An application of the foregoing rules to the facts of this case creates a situation 
analogous to Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1863). In that case, a transcript was 
necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be dismissed without the 
transcript. Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81. Similarly, in Idaho, an appellant must provide an 
adequate record or face procedural default. "It is well established that an appellant 
bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate court can 
review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where pertinent portions of the record 
are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial court." 
State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Beck, 128 Idaho 416, 
422 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. 
Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 873 (Ct. App. 1985); State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541 
11 
(Ct. App. 1992)). If the transcripts are missing, but the record contains court minutes, 
that may be sufficient so that a "meaningful review of [an appellant's] claim is possible, 
although the Idaho Court of Appeals has "strongly suggest[ed] that appellate counsel 
not rely on the district court minutes to provide an adequate record for [that] Court's 
review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999). If Ms. Easley fails to 
provide the appellate court with the requested items, the legal presumption will apply 
and Ms. Easley claims will not be addressed on their actual merits. If it is state action 
alone, which prevents her from access to the requested items, then such action is a 
violation of due process, as per Lane, and any such presumption should no longer 
apply. 
Whether the transcripts of the requested proceedings were before the district 
court at the time of the probation revocation hearing is not relevant in deciding whether 
the transcripts are relevant to the issues on appeal because in reaching a sentencing 
decision, a district court is not limited to considering only that information offered at the 
hearing from which the appeal is filed. Rather, a court is entitled to utilize knowledge 
gained from its own official position and observations. Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 
367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 2001); see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983) 
(recognizing that the findings of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon 
what the court heard during the trial); State v. Waf/ace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977) 
(recognizing that the court could rely upon "the number of certain types of criminal 
transactions that [the judge] has observed in the courts within his judicial district and the 
quantity of drugs therein involved"); State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984) 
(approving sentencing court's reliance upon evidence presented at the preliminary 
hearing from a previously dismissed case because "the judge hardly could be expected 
12 
to disregard what he already knew about Gibson from the other case"). Thus, whether 
the prior hearings were transcribed or not is irrelevant, because the court may rely upon 
the information it already knows from presiding over the prior hearings when it made the 
decision to revoke probation. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has recently issued an opinion in State v. Morgan, 
Docket No 39057,2012 Opinion No 38 (Ct. App. 2012), which addressed the foregoing 
argument. In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty and was placed on probation. Id. 
at 1. After a period of probation, the defendant admitted to violating the terms of his 
probation and the district court revoked probation but retained jurisdiction. Id. at 1-2. 
After he completed his rider, the district court placed the defendant on probation. Id. at 
2. The defendant admitted to violating the terms of his probation and the district court 
revoked probation. Id. The defendant appealed from the district court's second order 
revoking probation. Id. 
On appeal, the defendant filed a motion to augment the appellate record with 
transcripts associated with his first probation violation and disposition, which was denied 
by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. The defendant then raised as issues on appeal the 
question of whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal 
protection when it denied the motion to augment and the issue of whether the district 
court abused its discretion when it revoked probation. Id. at 2-3. The Idaho Court of 
Appeals held that the transcripts of the prior probation proceedings were not necessary 
for the appeal because "they were not before the district court in the second probation 
violation proceedings, and the district court gave no indication that it based its 
revocation decision upon anything that occurred during those proceedings." Id. at 4. 
While Morgan does directly deal with the issues raised in this appeal, it is 
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distinguishable because Ms. Easley is challenging not only the order revoking 
probation, but also the length of her sentence, which entails an analysis of the district 
court's sentencing rationale.4 
4 Another issue with Morgan is that it invites appellate counsel, in the event an appeal is 
assigned to the Court of Appeals, to file motions directly with the Court of Appeals which 
is not allowed under the Idaho Appellate Rules. In Morgan, the Court of Appeals 
refused to address Mr. Morgan's claim that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due 
process because it does not have the power to overrule a decision by the Idaho 
Supreme Court. Id. at 3. The Morgan Court went on to state that it would have the 
authority to review a renewed motion to augment if it was filed with the Court of Appeals 
after the appeal was assigned to the Court of Appeals and contained information or 
argument which was not presented to the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. However, this 
position is untenable because the Idaho Appellate Rules require all motions to be filed 
directly with the Idaho Supreme Court. For example, Idaho Appellate Rule 110 states 
as follows: 
All motions, petitions, briefs and other appellate documents, other than the 
initial notice of appeal, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court 
as required by the Idaho Appellate Rules with the court heading of the 
Supreme Court of the State of Idaho as provided by Rule 6. There shall 
be no separate filings directed to or filed with the Court of Appeals. In the 
event of an assignment of a case to the Court of Appeals, the title of the 
proceeding and the identifying number thereof shall not be changed 
except that the Clerk of the Supreme Court may add additional letters or 
other notations to the case number so as to identify the assignment of the 
case. All case files shall be maintained in the office of the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court. 
(emphasis added). Furthermore, Idaho Appellate Rule 30 requires that all motions to 
augment be filed with the Supreme Court. The relevant portions of I.A.R. 30 follow: 
Any party may move the Supreme Court to augment or delete from the 
settled reporter's transcript or clerk's or agency's record. 
Unless otherwise expressly ordered by the Supreme Court such motion 
shall be determined without oral argument. The reporter's transcript and 
clerk's or agency's record may also be augmented or portions deleted by 
stipulation of the parties and order of the Supreme Court. 
(emphasis added). Ms. Easley is not aware of any court rule which allows a party to an 
appeal to file a motion directly with the Court of Appeals. Idaho Appellate Rule 110 
expressly prohibits such filings. Therefore, the Morgan Court's statement that 
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Additionally, the requested items are within an Idaho appellate court's scope of 
review. The requested transcripts are relevant because Idaho appellate courts review 
all proceedings following sentencing when determining whether the court made 
appropriate sentencing determinations. See State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 
28 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following 
a period of probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before 
and after the original judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the 
sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and 
the revocation of probation." (emphasis added)).5 In other words, an appellate court 
reviewing a district court's sentencing/probationary decision conducts an independent 
review of the entire record to determine if the record supports the district court's 
decisions. This standard of review is necessary in Idaho because judges are not 
required to state their sentencing/probationary rationale on the record. State v. Nield, 
106 Idaho 665,666 (1984). 
Mr. Morgan could have filed a renewed motion to augment directly with the Court of 
Appeals is contrary to the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
5 In Morgan, supra, the Court of Appeals clarified the scope of review articulated in 
Hanington. Specifically it held: 
In reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily 
confine ourselves to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the 
time of the revocation of probation. However, that does not mean that all 
proceedings in the trial court up to and including sentencing are germane. 
The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision 
to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the 
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues 
which are properly made part of the record on appeal. 
Morgan, at 4. (original emphasis). As stated above, Morgan is distinguishable as 
Ms. Easley is raising a sentencing claim in this appeal. 
15 
Further support for Ms. Easley's position can be found in State v. Warren, 123 
Idaho 20 (Ct. App.1992). In that case, Mr. Warren was convicted of aggravated battery 
in 1988 and placed on probation. Id. at 21. Mr. Warren's probation was then revoked 
and the district court retained jurisdiction for 180 days. Id. After completing the period 
of retained jurisdiction, Mr. Warren was placed on another period of probation, which 
was ultimately revoked. Id. The district court then sua sponte reduced the length of 
Mr. Warren's sentence. Id. Mr. Warren then appealed and alleged that the district court 
should have further reduced the length of his sentence. Id. In support of that position, 
Mr. Warren argued that his probation violation was trivial. Id. The Court of Appeals 
addressed that argument stating "Warren incorrectly points to the nature of the 
probation violation by arguing that his violation was trivial. This Court must look at the 
nature of the original criminal offense, in this case aggravated battery where Warren bit 
off his victim's ear." Id. However, the Court of Appeals did not address the merits of his 
sentence reduction claim because Mr. Warren had failed to provide a copy of the 
original Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI) and a transcript of the 
original sentencing hearing. Id. Even though Mr. Warren did not appeal from the 
original sentence, and the original sentencing hearing occurred years before the 
decision at issue, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that the transcript of that hearing was 
necessary to address Mr. Warren's claims of error. Moreover, there was no indication 
that a transcript of that hearing was created before the probation violation hearing or 
that the district court referenced the original sentencing hearing at the probation 
violation disposition hearing. It appears that the Court of Appeals assumed that the 
original sentencing hearing would address the nature of the original offense. 
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Had Ms. Easley failed to request the transcripts at issue, the Warren opinion 
indicates that the merits of Ms. Easley's sentencing issues would not be addressed on 
appeal. See also Coma, 133 Idaho at 34 ("It is well established that an appellant bears 
the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate court can review the 
merits of the claims of error, ... and where pertinent portions of the record are missing 
on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial court."); State v. Rundle, 
107 Idaho 936, 937 (Ct. App. 1984) ("When a discretionary decision related to 
sentencing is challenged on appeal, the appellant bears the burden of presenting a 
sufficient record to evaluate the merits of the challenge. "). 
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both 
due process and equal protection to deny indigent defendants transcripts of trial 
proceedings on appeal. The requested transcripts are relevant to the issues on appeal 
because the applicable standard of review requires the appellate court to conduct an 
impendent review of a" of the proceedings before the district court. Under this standard 
of review, the focus is not on the district court's express sentencing rationale,6 to the 
contrary, the question on appeal is if the record itself supports the district court's 
ultimate sentencing/probationary decisions. As such, the decision to deny Ms. Easley's 
request for the transcripts wi" render her appeal meaningless because it wi" be 
presumed that the missing transcripts support the district court's sentencing decisions. 
This functions as a procedural bar to the review of Ms. Easley's appellate sentencing 
6 However, an abuse of discretion might be found if the district court employs a 
particularly unreasonable or absurd sentencing/probationary analysis. Even under 
those circumstances, the appellate court will still employ an independent review of the 
record to determine if the ultimate decision is sound despite the unreasonable analysis. 
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claims on the merits, and therefore, Ms. Easley should either be provided with the 
requested transcripts or the presumption should not be applied. 
2. The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Easley With Access 
To The Requested Transcripts Has Denied Her Due Process Because 
She Cannot Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal 
In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
in the context of death penalty cases was selectively incorporated to the states through 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. In coming to this conclusion, the United State Supreme Court reasoned 
that the ability to be heard by counsel is so inextricably related to due process that the 
denial of counsel is tantamount to the denial of a hearing. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69. The 
Supreme Court also stated that under the facts of Powell "the necessity of counsel was 
so vital and imperative that the failure to make an effective appointment of counsel was 
likewise a denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment ... 
[toJ hold otherwise would be to ignore the fundamental postulate, already adverted to, 
'that there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of 
free government which no member of the Union may disregard.'" Id. at 71-72. 
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the United States Supreme Court 
relied on Griffin, supra, and its progeny and determined that the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants 
the right to counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the protection of 
Douglas was extended to the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal. 
According to the United States Supreme Court: 
In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to 
counsel on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant 
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has a right to counsel at trial would be a futile gesture unless it 
comprehended the right to effective assistance of counsel. 
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397. 
The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the 
United States Supreme Court, appellate counsel must make a conscientious 
examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made. 
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), held that the constitutional requirements 
of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an 
active advocate on behalf of his client .... [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he 
support his client's appeal to the best of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127 
Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995). In this case, the lack of access to the requested 
transcripts prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination of the 
case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether there is 
an additional issue to raise, or whether there is a factual support either in favor of any 
argument made or undercutting an argument. Therefore, Mr. Easley has not obtained 
review of the court proceedings based on the merits and was not provided with effective 
assistance of counsel in that endeavor. 
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991», the Idaho Supreme Court held 
that the starting point for evaluating whether counsel renders effective assistance of 
counsel in a criminal action is the American Bar Association, Standards For Criminal 
Justice, The Defense Function. These standards offer insight into the role and 
responsibilities of appellate counsel. Regarding appel/ate counsel, the standards state: 
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional 
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel, 
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect 
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the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . .. Counsel 
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or 
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a 
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance. 
Standard 4-B.3(b). In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate 
counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be 
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's 
decision to revoke probation. Further, counsel is unable to advise Ms. Easley on the 
probable role the transcripts may play in the appeal. 
Ms. Easley is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and 
effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to the relevant 
transcripts. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Ms. Easley her 
constitutional right to due process which includes a right to the effective assistance of 
counsel in this appeal. Accordingly, appellate counsel should be provided with access 
to the requested transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any 
necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of that review. 
II. 
The Fifth Judicial District's Practice Which, Allows The Prosecutor To Prevent The 
District Court From Considering A Defendant As A Candidate For Mental Health Court 
Violates Idaho's Separation Of Powers Doctrine 
A. Standard Of Review 
"The issues on appeal in this case are questions of statutory or constitutional 
construction or interpretation, all of which are issues of law over which this Court 
exercises free review." Osmunson v. State, 135 Idaho 292,294 (2000). 
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B. The Fifth Judicial District's Prosecutorial Veto Power Over Mental Health Court 
Placement Decisions Constitutes A Violation Of Idaho's Separation Of 
Powers Doctrine And, Thus, Constitutes Fundamental Error 
Ms. Easley argues that the 5th Judicial District's practice requiring the 
prosecutor's consent before a district court can place a defendant into a mental health 
court constitutes a violation of the separation of powers doctrine contained in Article 1/, 
Section 1 of the Idaho Constitution. At the final probation violation disposition hearing, 
the district court admitted a letter from the Twin Falls mental health court team which 
stated that the "unanimous consensus of the team is that Ms. Easley would be an 
appropriate candidate for Mental Health Court participation and would likely benefit from 
inclusion.,,7 (PSI, p.126l At that hearing, trial counsel made the following statement: 
But I do want to make it clear, at least for the record, that the procedure in 
Twin Falls County, when an individual comes before the court with 
documented mental health issues, ... that individual may very well be 
appropriate for Mental Health Court, it's a court for individuals like 
Ms. Easley who have struggled on probation and who have underlying 
mental health issues that may have caused that failure to comply with 
probation, and that the procedure is that, even with an application in hand 
and the Mental Health Court saying that she she's appropriate for the 
program, that the prosecutor has the ability to prevent the court from even 
considering that option. 
(01/31/12 Tr., p.38, Ls.12 - p.39, L.1, p.39, Ls.10-24.) Trial counsel then lodged 
objections to this procedure based on various sections of both the United States 
Constitution and the Idaho Constitution, but the district court overruled the objections. 
(01/13/12 Tr., p.41, Ls.3-8.) The district court then observed that Ms. Easley's mental 
health overlays much of her conduct and that trial counsel made a good argument in 
favor of her placement into mental health court. (01/31/12 Tr., p.47 - p.48, L.21.) The 
7 That letter went on to note that the prosecutor's office had not agreed to allow her to 
apply to the program which disqualified her participation. (PSI, p.126.) 
8 This brief will adhere to the pagination of the electronic PSI, and the various 
attachments contained therein. 
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district court did not even consider mental health court because the prosecutor "vetoed 
[the] issue, I have to then just simply look at whether probation as constituted is a 
viable option for at this juncture .... J! (01/31/12 Tr., pA8, Ls.22-25.) In other words, 
the district court concluded that it would have considered placing Ms. Easley into the 
mental health court. The only reason this option was not considered was the 
prosecutor's veto. 
Ms. Easley recognizes that she did not object to the prosecutorial veto power on 
the basis that it violated Article ", Section 1 of the Idaho Constitution. However, she 
argues that this issue can be raised for the first time on appeal because it constitutes 
fundamental error. In State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010), the Idaho Supreme Court 
recently clarified the test for fundamental error. In order to make a showing of 
fundamental error, the defendant must demonstrate: (1) the error was of constitutional 
magnitude - i.e. one or more of the defendant's un-waived constitutional rights were 
violated; (2) the error was plain on the face of the record and that the failure to object 
was not the product of a tactical decision; and (3) the error was prejudicial, which 
requires the defendant to show a reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the 
outcome of the proceedings. Id. at 226. Ms. Easley submits that she meets this 
standard. 
1. Ms. Easley's Claim Of Error Meets The First Prong Of The Perry 
Fundamental Error Standard As An Alleged Violation Of The 
Separation Of Powers Doctrine Is Of Constitutional Magnitude 
"The separation of powers doctrine embodies the concept that the three 
branches of government, legislative, executive and judicial, should remain separate and 
distinct so that each is able to operate independently." Sweeney v. Otter, 119 Idaho 
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135,139 (1990). The separation of powers doctrine is found in Article II, Section 10f the 
Idaho Constitution which follows: 
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three 
distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person 
or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly 
belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any powers properly 
belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly 
directed or permitted. 
On appeal, Ms. Easley is arguing that allowing the prosecutor to prevent the 
district court from even considering her placement into the Twin Falls mental health 
court violates Article II, Section 1 of the Idaho Constitution. As such her claim of error 
alleges a constitutional violation. 
Article II, Section 1 of the Idaho Constitution precludes separate branches of 
government from exercising functions or powers granted to another branch of 
government. Generally speaking, the powers of the three branches of government are 
as follows: 
It was early held by this court that the power to define crimes and 
prescribe penalties belongs to the legislative department of government; 
that the power to try offenders, and to enter judgment convicting and 
sentencing those found guilty, belongs to the judicial department; that the 
power and prerogative of granting pardons, paroles or commutations 
belong to the executive department. 
Spanton v. Clapp, 78 Idaho 234,237 (1956). 
The first step in the separation of powers analysis is determining what the role of 
a district court is in relation to the prosecuting attorney in a criminal prosecution. In 
State v. Whatfield, _ Idaho _, 236 P. 862 (1925) the only question at issue was 
whether a prosecuting attorney is an executive officer of the State of Idaho. Id. at 862. 
I n resolving that issue, the Idaho Supreme Court first noted the constitutional provision 
which authorizes the creation of prosecuting attorneys is found in Article V of the Idaho 
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Constitution, which is the same article that prescribes the powers of the judiciary. Id. 
The Court then employed the following analysis: 
It is plain that the intention of the framers of the Constitution, and of 
the people in adopting it, was to do away with the office of district attorney 
for each county, and that, by placing the creation, election, qualifications, 
tenure of office, and duties of the office of district attorney in that part of 
the Constitution devoted to the judicial department, they charged him with 
the performance of duties and the exercise of powers properly belonging 
to the judicial department. While not making of him a judicial officer in the 
sense of being a judge, yet he was, if not a quasi judicial officer, or an 
officer of the court, at least an officer of the judicial department, charged 
with the exercise of powers properly belonging thereto. 
Id. at 862-863 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court went on to 
state that: 
While that part of Const. art. 5, § 18, which provides that the 
prosecuting attorney shall perform such duties as may be prescribed by 
law, would permit the exercise by him of powers properly belonging to the 
executive department if the Legislature prescribed such duties, he could 
exercise only such executive powers-that is, powers properly belonging to 
the executive department-as in the Constitution expressly directed or 
permitted. Const. art. 2, § 1. While his duties, as prescribed by law, may 
call upon him to perform executive functions in executing or administering 
the laws, it cannot reasonably be said that he was intended by the 
Constitution to be an executive officer, or to be included in the executive 
department, or a classification as broad as that of an "executive officer of 
this state." 
Id. at 863 (emphasis added). While a prosecutor generally belongs to the judicial 
department, as an officer of the court, the Supreme Court was careful to note that 
prosecutors do carry out executive functions as prescribed by law. 
Subsequent Idaho Supreme Court opinions have provided some clarification as 
to exactly what executive functions prosecutors are charged to fulfill. In Hooper v. 
State, 150 Idaho 497, 500 (2011), the Idaho Supreme Court stated that, "When a county 
prosecutor charges a defendant in a criminal proceeding, he or she is exercising the 
State's inherent sovereign power to prosecute crime." While resolving the role of the 
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Attorney General's office vis-a-vis a county prosecutor's office in prosecuting an 
offense, the Supreme Court noted that "the prosecuting attorney has primary 
responsibility for the enforcement of state penal laws .... " State v. Summer, 139 Idaho 
219, 224 (2003). 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has also provided some guidance on this issue. In 
State v. Rae, 139 Idaho 650, 652-653 (Ct. App. 2004), one of the issues on appeal 
concerned a district court's decision to sua sponte provide a jury instruction on a lesser 
included offense which was not requested by either party. On appeal, the defendant 
argued that the district court's decision to sua sponte instruct on a lesser included 
offense violated Idaho's separation of powers doctrine because "the principle of 
separation of powers prohibits the judicial branch from, essentially, charging a 
defendant with a new crime." Id. at 653. In rejecting this argument, the Court of 
Appeals reasoned "that courts have inherent authority to instruct a jury on lesser 
included offenses, and such authority does not infringe upon the power of charging and 
prosecuting, which is reserved to the executive branch." Id. 
Properly distilled, the foregoing points of authority stand for the position that 
county prosecutors are part of the judicial department but carry out executive duties 
when proceeding with criminal charges. It follows that in the specific context of a 
criminal prosecution, the duties generally carried out by the district court are judicial in 
nature and those carried out by the prosecutor are executive in nature. As such, a 
separation of powers violation can be found in instances where the prosecutor 
exercises a judicial power during criminal proceedings, even though, generally, a 
prosecutor is a member of the judiCial branch. 
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Ms. Easley's position is further bolstered by the fact that a Deputy Attorney 
General may participate in county criminal proceedings as a special prosecutor. 
I.C. § 67-1401; see a/so Summer, 139 Idaho at 223-224. This is important because the 
Attorney General is expressly enumerated as a member of Idaho's executive branch in 
Article IV, Section 1 of the Idaho Constitution. Since a member of the executive branch 
can participate in criminal prosecution at the county level, the role of a prosecutor must 
be inherently executive or otherwise I.C. § 67-1401 violates Article II, Section 1 of the 
Idaho Constitution because it would enable a Deputy Attorney General, who is 
undoubtedly a member of the executive branch, to exercise a judicial power. 
The next question is whether the exercise of power at issue, i.e. the prosecutorial 
veto over admission into a mental health court, is executive or judicial in nature. 
Ms. Easley argues that it is part and parcel of the district court's sentencing power 
because, in Ms. Easley's case, the decision of whether to place her into the Twin Falls 
mental health court occurred after the district court had entered its judgments of 
conviction. (R., pp.78-86, 366-372.) Thus, the question before the district court at the 
final probation violation disposition hearing was whether to continue her probation or to 
revoke her probation and execute the underlying sentence. In that context, the decision 
to place Ms. Easley into the mental health court was no different than imposing any 
other term of probation, which Idaho expressly vests with the district court. I.C. § 19-
2601 (2). As such, the practice in the 5th Judicial District, which allows the prosecutor to 
decide whether a defendant is placed into mental health court, constitutes an executive 
usurpation of the district court's judicial power to impose the terms of probation. 
Ms. Easley is not aware of any Idaho case which addresses this issue. However, 
the Supreme Court of Wyoming has addressed a very similar issue in Biflis v. State, 800 
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P.2d 401 (Wyo. 1990). In Billis, the constitutionality of a probation statute was before 
the Wyoming Supreme Court. Id. at 403. The statute at issue was W.S. 7-13-301, 
which according to the Wyoming Supreme Court: 
Id. 
[I]s a probation statute that applies to a criminal defendant who has never 
before been convicted of a felony and is presently charged with, has 
pleaded guilty to, or has been found guilty of an offense within a certain 
group of felonies and misdemeanors. Under the statute, if both the 
defendant and the state consent, the court may defer further prosecution 
proceedings and place the defendant on probation without entry of a 
judgment of guilt or conviction. 9 
There were several constitutional challenges to this statute, but the primary, and 
relevant, challenge was a separation of powers argument. Id. at 412-428. The 
defense's specific argument follows: 
[TJhe judicial department has the power to decide whether to defer a 
criminal prosecution and place a defendant on probation during the time 
period those prosecution proceedings are being deferred. Next, they claim 
that the disposition of deferral and probation without the entry of a final 
judgment of conviction or guilt is a sentence, and also that this power to 
decide to defer emanates from the judicial power to impose a sentence. 
They maintain that, as a result, the state's consent requirement placed by 
the legislature in "new 301" is a constitutionally impermissible 
encroachment on the judicial power by the executive department. 
Id. at 415. (citation omitted). 
In resolving this issue, the Bil/is Court first engaged in a historical analysis of 
Wyoming's separation of powers doctrine and the individual powers of each branch of 
government. 10 The first conclusion which was drawn during that analysis was that 
9 This statute is similar to Idaho's withheld judgment statute I.C. § 19-2601 (3). 
However, it is distinguishable, as I.C. § 19-2601 (3) does not require the district court to 
obtain prosecutorial consent before entering a withheld judgment. In Idaho, that 
decision is left up to the district court. 
10 In that discussion, the Wyoming Supreme Court noted that Wyoming probably 
borrowed its Constitution's separation of powers provision from Idaho and Montana. Id. 
at 413. In fact, Wyoming's separation of powers provision, contained in Article II, 
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Wyoming has a compartmental form of government, as opposed to an integrated 
system, which is similar to the federal scheme, "replete with checks and balances." Id. 
414-415. The Bil/is Court then stated that the legislature's role in Wyoming's system is 
to declare what acts are punishable and prescribe punishment for those crimes. Id. at 
415. The judicial branch's role is to "adjudicate, to pronounce judgment and carry it into 
effect." Id. However, in Wyoming "sentencing is not inherently or exclusively a judicial 
function," as a court cannot impose a sentence below a legislatively created mandatory 
minimum and the executive branch holds the pardon power. Id. at 417-418. 
The Court then stated that the executive branch, through the prosecutor, has 
exclusive power to "make the charging decision and prosecute" a person. Id. at 417. 
As part of this power to prosecute, the Bil/is Court stated that the prosecution has 
virtually total control over the prosecution of a case which includes the power to dismiss 
charges, reduce charges, and defer charges before the entry of judgment. Id. at 417-
422. The Court then concluded that the Wyoming "withheld judgment" statute's 
requirement for prosecutorial consent was merely an extension of the prosecution's 
ability to dismiss charges before the entry of judgment. Id. at 421. In coming to that 
conclusion, the Wyoming Supreme Court was careful to note that a defendant's 
placement on probation under its "withheld judgment" statute occurs before the entry of 
judgment and that the "term of probation" ordered pursuant to that statute is not a 
sentence. Id. at 421-423. The Billis Court ultimately held as follows: 
In light of the case law identifying and describing these 
governmental powers, and since probation without entry of a judgment is 
not a sentence, we are compelled to conclude that the power to decide 
whether a criminal defendant who has never before been convicted of a 
felony shall be treated under "new 301" belongs to the executive 
Section 1 of the Wyoming Constitution, is virtually identical to Idaho's separation of 
powers provision which is also located in Article II, Section 1 of Idaho's Constitution. Id. 
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department as an integral part of its blended prosecution power. The 
"defer-probation" decision under "new 301" is not a decision to impose 
sentence; rather, it is a decision intimately related to the decisions to file 
charges, to reduce charges, to plea bargain, and to dismiss charges. All 
these decisions are committed to the sound discretion of the prosecutor as 
an officer of the executive department. We hold, therefore, that the 
executive department, not the judicial department, has the power to 
decide whether to defer prosecution under "new 301. The exercise of that 
prosecutorial discretion is not subject to judicial review as long as any 
unjustifiable or suspect factors such as race, religion, or other arbitrary or 
discriminatory classification are not involved. 
The judiciary exercises the power of adjudication and imposition of 
sentence when it enters final judgment of conviction, but not before. The 
prosecution exercises its prosecution power before entry of final judgment, 
but not after. Probation before entry of final judgment occurs within the 
prosecution phase of the criminal judicial process. Since the prosecutor 
exercises the prosecution power during that phase, including the power to 
file charges, to reduce charges, and to dismiss charges, it is correct that 
the prosecutor also have the power to consent to deferral of prosecution 
proceedings before entry of final judgment. 
On the other hand, probation after entry of final judgment occurs 
within the adjudication phase of the criminal judicial process. Since the 
judiciary exercises the adjudication power during that phase, including the 
power to impose sentence, we are not surprised that the legislature did 
not attempt to require the state's consent to probation after entry of final 
judgment. It is correct that the judiciary have the power to impose 
probation after entry of final judgment. 
Id. at 426 (original emphasis). 
Ms. Easley argues that the Billis opinion provides guidance in her case. It is 
important to note that, procedurally, Ms. Easley is not similarly situated to the 
defendants in Billis because Ms. Easley did not receive a withheld judgment pursuant to 
I.C. § 19-2601 (3); instead Ms. Easley was on probation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2601 (2) 
(R., pp.78-86, 366-372), which means that the district court had already entered 
judgments and imposed sentences in both of her cases. (R., pp.78-86, 366-372.) See 
Bojorquez v. State 135 Idaho 758, 761 (Ct. App. 2000) ("Idaho appellate courts have 
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long adhered to the principle that a sentence is imposed when initially pronounced even 
if its execution is later postponed when the trial court suspends the sentence . . . . 
Placing a defendant on probation merely suspends execution of the previously imposed 
sentence."}. It follows from the rationale of the Bil/is case that once the district court 
entered the judgments of conviction and imposed Ms. Easley's sentences, the executive 
role of the prosecutor ended, and the district court in its judicial capacity controlled 
whether to execute the sentence or suspend the sentence. This is consistent with 
Idaho's conception of judicial power as "the power to try, convict and sentence those 
guilty of crimes belongs to the judiciary." State v. Cootz, 110 Idaho 807, 817 (Ct. App. 
1986). "[A] sentencing court may make the [probationer] subject to 'such terms and 
conditions as it deems necessary and expedient.'" State v. Josephson, 125 Idaho 119, 
(Ct. App. 1993) (citing I.C. § 19-2601 (2)) 11 (emphasis added). Since Idaho courts 
control the post-judgment judicial decision to place a person on probation and 
determine the terms of probation, the prosecutorial veto over one of the potential terms 
11 The judicial power to control the terms of a defendant's probation is codified in 
I.C. § 19-2601 (2), which follows: 
Whenever any person shall have been convicted, or enter a plea of guilty, 
in any district court of the state of Idaho, of or to any crime against the 
laws of the state, except those of treason or murder, the court in its 
discretion, may: 
2. Suspend the execution of the judgment at the time of 
judgment or at any time during the term of a sentence in the 
county jail and place the defendant on probation under such 
terms and conditions as it deems necessary and expedient. 
Clearly, the Idaho Legislature has recognized that imposition of the terms of probation is 
inherently a judicial function, as it identified the district court as the appropriate state 
actor to impose and control the terms of probation. 
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of probation violates the separation of powers provision contained in Article II, Section 1 
of the Idaho Constitution. See State v. Finch, 79 Idaho 275, 281 (1957) ("Judicial power 
cannot be conferred upon any agency of the executive department, in the absence of 
constitutional authority, where the constitution has specifically provided for the creation 
of a judicial system."); see a/so Estep v. Commissioners of Boundary County, 122 Idaho 
345, 347 (1992) ("The only exception to the separation of powers doctrine occurs 
where the exercise of another branch's power is expressly directed or permitted by the 
constitution. "). 
2. Ms. Easley's Claim Of Error Meets The Second Prong Of The Perry 
Fundamental Error Standard, As Her Claim Of Error Is Clear From 
The Record And Her Failure To Object On This Basis Was Not 
Tactical 
Ms. Easley's claim of error based on Idaho's separation of powers doctrine is 
clear from the record because no new facts are required for appellate review. The only 
facts necessary for review are those that were established at the final probation 
violation disposition hearing (see Section II(B), supra), and the two judgments which 
imposed her sentences. (R., pp.78-86, 366-372.) 
Ms. Easley recognizes that the Idaho Court of Appeals recently held that "the 
second element of the Perry test for fundamental error, requiring the error plainly exist, 
necessitates a showing by the appellant that existing authorities have unequivocally 
resolved the issue in the appellant's favor." State v. Hadden, 152 Idaho 371, (C1. App. 
2012). (original emphasis). Ms. Easley disputes this standard because the Idaho 
Supreme Court stated in Perry "the error must be clear or obvious, without the need for 
any additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information as 
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to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision." Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. 
(emphasis added). 
The Idaho Supreme Court used the phrase "without the need for additional 
information" to clarify what it meant by error which is clear from the appellate record. It 
does not follow that clear from the record was also meant to include case authority 
which directly addresses the issue at hand. In fact, the fundamental error standard is 
based on a defendant's federal guarantee of due process contained in the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Perry, 150 Idaho at 224. It makes little sense to circumscribe the due 
process clause's guarantee to fair trial and a fair tribunal solely based on the fact that 
there is no case declaring an unfair action act to be unconstitutional. Such a standard 
would foreclose due process protections for a defendant that happened to be the first 
person exposed to specific constitutional violation. For example, Ms. Easley is not 
aware on any case holding it is a violation of the separation of powers doctrine for a 
district court to allow a prosecutor to decide the actual length of a defendant's sentence. 
However, if this did occur, and the defense failed to object, under the Hadden opinion, 
this clear constitutional violation could not be challenged for the first time on appeal. As 
such, Ms. Easley argues that the Hadden Court's interpretation of Perry artificially 
narrows the due process protections set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court in the Perry 
fundamental error standard. 
The next issue concerning the question of whether Ms. Easley can demonstrate 
clear error is whether her failure to object to the prosecutorial veto on the basis of Article 
II, Section 1 of the Idaho Constitution was a tactical decision by trial counsel. In this 
case it is clear that the decision was not tactical because trial counsel objected to that 
veto power on due process grounds specifically based on Article I, Sections 6 and 13 of 
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the Idaho State Constitution as well as the Fifth, Sixth, Eight, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution. (01/31/12 Tr., p.39, L.22 - pAO, L.11.) 
Additionally, Ms. Easley argued that the prosecutorial veto power violated the 
constitutional requirement found in Article V, Section 26 of the Idaho Constitution that all 
court procedures be uniformly operated throughout the State. (01/31/12 Tr., pAO, 
LS.17 -22.) It is appears from the record that Ms. Easley's counsel objected to the 
prosecutorial veto power on every basis he could think of at the probation violation 
disposition hearing. Thus, there was no strategic benefit to be gained from failing to 
make another constitutional objection based on Idaho's separation of powers doctrine. 
3. Ms. Easley's Claim Of Error Meets The Third Prong Of The Perry 
Fundamental Error Standard As She Was Prejudiced By The 
Prosecutor's Decision To Preclude The District Court From 
Considering Her As A Candidate For The 5th Judicial District's 
Mental Health Court 
Ms. Easley can establish prejudice because there was a reasonable possibility 
that the district court would have placed her into mental health court but for the 
prosecutorial veto. As mentioned above, the Mental Health Court team wrote a letter 
wherein it indicated it would accept Ms. Easley into the mental health court, but stated it 
couldn't because the prosecutor did not agree with its determination. (PSI, p.126.) That 
letter was before the district court at the final probation violation disposition hearing. 
(01/31/12 Tr., p.38, L.16 - p.39, LA.) At the same hearing, the district court stated: 
Well, as I indicated earlier, in terms of the request for mental health 
court, I do not believe that, based upon the way the court is designed and 
has been established since its beginning stages in this county and in this 
Fifth District, frankly, that this prosecutor has been provided an absolute 
veto over this post-judgment court. Whether that complies with and 
comports with the Idaho or U.S. Constitutions, I guess, is an issue that 
perhaps needs to be addressed at a higher level than I can. Those may 
indeed make reasonable arguments to another court. But for purposes of 
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today, that is our procedure in this jurisdiction; and I will comply with it, 
Ma'am, which means essentially that my jurisdiction, my ability, is limited. 
In looking at your history, it does appear that mental health overlays 
much of what's gone on here and that there is certainly a good argument 
to be made that [trial counsel] has made for potentially why you [should] 
be afforded a mental health court placement, were it not for the veto. 
But since that is a vetoed issue, I have to then just simply look at 
whether probation as constituted is a viable option for at this juncture; and 
I simply can't conclude that it is. I have to decide whether probation is 
achieving rehabilitative goals and whether that's consistent with protecting 
society and the good order of society to continue it. Both of those 
questions, without a very strict supervision in a setting such as Mental 
Health Court, I believe, can't be accomplished. 
(01/31/12 Tr., p.47, L.23 - p.49, L.7.) There is a reasonable possibility that the district 
court would have placed her into the mental health program because she was pre-
approved by the mental health team, and the district court was very candid about the 
fact that her trial counsel made a good case for her participation in that program. The 
district court also stated that her mental health overlays many of her actions in the two 
cases. The district court would not have made those statements if it thought she was 
not a viable candidate for the mental health court. Instead, it would have stated on the 
record that it wouldn't even consider placing her into the program. As such, Ms. Easley 
has met her burden of proving prejudice. 
4. Summary 
Ms. Easley has established fundamental error, as her claim of error is based on a 
constitutional violation. Clear error has been demonstrated because the record on 
appeal will not require the inclusion of additional facts to determine whether the 
prosecutorial veto over a defendant's placement into the 5th Judicial District's mental 
health court violates the separation of powers doctrine set forth in Article II, Section 1 of 
the Idaho Constitution because the argument is almost entirely legal. Additionally, the 
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failure to object to the prosecutorial veto on the basis of Article II, Section 1 of the Idaho 
Constitution was not tactical as Ms. Easley made lodged objections to the veto power 
and there is no potential advantage she would gain by failing to object on a separation 
of powers basis. Ms. Easley can establish prejudice because there is a reasonable 
possibility that she would have be placed into the mental health program but for the 
prosecutorial veto, This is evident because she was pre approved by the mental health 
court team, and the district court stated that there was a good argument for her 
participation in to the program. 
Turning to the substance of the argument, the Idaho Constitution requires that 
the three branches of government exercise only the powers granted to them by the 
Idaho Constitution. While a prosecutor holds a quasi judicial role, a prosecutor is 
performing an executive role when prosecuting a criminal case. After a district court 
imposes a sentence and suspends the execution of a sentence, its decision over the 
terms of probation is inherently judicial in nature. When the 5th judicial district allows 
the prosecutor to make that decision in regard to placement into mental health court, 
that functions as an unconstitutional exercise of a judicial power by the executive 
branch of the government. 
III. 
The Fifth Judicial District's Prosecutorial Veto Power Over The Placement Of A 
Defendant Into Mental Health Court Violates The Constitutional Requirement That All 
Courts Of The Same Class Have Uniform Judicial Powers, Procedures, And Practices 12 
At the final probation violation disposition hearing, trial counsel lodged the 
following objection to the prosecuting attorney's veto power, "In addition, [I] cite to 
12 The applicable standard of review was articulated in Section II(A), supra, and is 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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Article V, Section 26 of the Idaho Constitution, with regards to the uniform operation of 
court procedures throughout the [S]tate. To my knowledge, this is not done this way in 
any other county in the [S]tate of Idaho. And so, [I] lodge that objection." (01/31/12 
Tr., p.40, LS.17 -22.) 
Article V, Section 26 of the Idaho Constitution, follows: 
All laws relating to courts shall be general and of uniform operation 
throughout the state, and the organized judicial powers, proceedings, and 
practices of all the courts of the same class or grade, so far as regulated 
by law, and the force and effect of the proceedings, judgments, and 
decrees of such courts, severally, shall be uniform. 
There is little case law in Idaho dealing with Article V, Section 26 of the Idaho 
Constitution. However, some guidance can be found in Bear Lake County v. Budge, 
_ Idaho _, 75 P. 614 (1904). In that case, the legislature passed a law allowing 
notice for the adjudication of water rights to be served via publication in a newspaper as 
opposed to personal service. This statute was challenged on various grounds, and one 
of them was based on Article V, Section 26 of the Idaho Constitution. The Idaho 
Supreme Court's resolution of this argument follows: 
Said provisions for the service of summons clearly violate the 
provisions of section 26, art. 5, of our state Constitution, which provides 
that all laws relating to courts shall be general and of uniform operation 
throughout the state, and the organized judicial powers, proceedings, and 
practices of a/l the courts of the same class or grade shall be uniform; and 
is in violation of the provisions of paragraph 4 of section 19 of article 3 of 
our Constitution, which prohibits special or local legislation regulating 
practice of courts of justice. We have a general law providing how a 
summons must be served in cases to quiet title or determine adverse 
interests to private property, and the provisions [therefore] in the act under 
consideration provide a different method in cases brought by a water 
commissioner for that purpose. 
Id. at 617-618. 
Idaho Code Section 19-2601 (2) is the general law of the State of Idaho and 
provides that the district court, not the prosecutor, determines the terms of probation. 
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As argued in Section 11(8)(1), supra, the requirement that a defendant participate and 
complete a mental health court program is a term of probation and I.C. § 19-2601 (2), 
states that the district court is the state actor which imposes terms of probation. As 
such, the prosecutorial veto is inconsistent with the general laws because it allows the 
prosecutor to control this term of probation. Since the Budge Court found that the 
method of service of process for water right litigation was unconstitutional because it 
was different than the general rules for service of a complaint, the prosecutorial veto 
power should be found unconstitutional on the same basis. 
Additionally, Article V, Section 26 of the Idaho Constitution requires that all courts 
of the same class must have uniform powers, proceedings, and practices. As stated by 
trial counsel, the 5th judicial district is the only district in the State which allows for a 
prosecutorial veto of a defendant's admission into the mental health court. (01/31/12 
Tr., pAD, Ls.17-22.) The prosecutorial veto functions as a limitation of judicial power 
and a judicial practice which is unique to the district courts of the 5th judicial district. As 
such, it is in violation of Article V, Section 26 of the Idaho Constitution because that 
limitation of court power and that unique practice and procedure is not in line with the 
other district courts in the rest of the State. 
In sum, the prosecutorial veto over a defendant's placement into mental health 
court violates Article V, Section 26 of the Idaho Constitution because it is the only 
judicial district in Idaho with such a practice. Additionally, it is not in line with the 
general laws of Idaho, specifically I.C. § 19-2601 (2), which affords the district court the 
power to determine the terms of a defendant's probation. 
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IV. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion \J\Jhen It Revoked Ms. Easley's Probation 
Ms. Easley asserts that, given any view of the facts, the district court abused its 
discretion when it revoked her probation. When a defendant appeals from an order 
revoking probation the Idaho Court of Appeals has utilized the following framework: 
The decision to revoke a defendant's probation on a suspended sentence 
is within the discretion of the district court. I.C. § 20-222. In a probation 
revocation proceeding, two threshold questions are posed: (1) did the 
probationer violate the terms of probation; and, if so, (2) should probation 
be revoked? State v. Case, 112 Idaho 1136 (Ct. App. 1987). 
State v. Corder, 115 Idaho 1137, 1138 (Ct. App. 1989). 
Ms. Easley concedes that she violated the terms of her probation. Accordingly, 
she only contests the district court's decision to revoke her probation. "A district court's 
decision to revoke probation will not be overturned on appeal absent a showing that the 
court abused its discretion." State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009). "When a 
district court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court 
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the lower court correctly perceived 
the issue as one of discretion, acted within the boundaries of such discretion and 
consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it, and 
reached its decision by an exercise of reason." State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923 
(Ct. App. 2003). "In deciding whether revocation of probation is the appropriate 
response to a violation, the court considers whether the probation is achieving the goal 
of rehabilitation and whether continued probation is consistent with the protection of 
society." State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App. 2001). 
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In this case, Ms. Easley's probation violations were not entirely willful due to her 
mental health issues. Trial counsel provided the following explanation about 
Ms. Easley's most recent probation violations: 
She got off of the rider in February, 2011 ... and started on probation. 
The substance abuse evaluation, they had set a time for it; she missed the 
first one, couldn't make it there on time. And so the treatment provider 
told her, if you can't make it, than I'm going to call the probation officer. 
In addition with the UA issue, there are several missed UAs 
reflected in the probation report; but Ms. Easley indicates to me that they 
told her, if she didn't have the money to test, and I think the court's familiar 
with that process, if she didn't have the money to test, that they would not 
allow her to test if she came in, in any event. And so the ones she was 
unable to pay for, she did not come in for. And the, also, [she] did not 
have the money to perform community service and had been unable to 
secure adequate employment to make that happen. 
The combination of those factors put her in a mode where, [she] 
just became overwhelmed with the obligations .... 
Again, I think that [it was] kind of a reaction, essentially putting her 
head in the sand when times get too tough ... and to stay away from 
everything is a reflection of the post-traumatic stress disorder that's 
reflected in the mental health evaluation .... 
(01/31/12 Tr., p.42, L.21 - p.44, L.10.) Trial counsel went on to argue that regular 
probation did not provide a person with Ms. Easley's mental health issues with the 
appropriate amount of supervision. (01/31/12 Tr., p.44, Ls.12-p.21.) However, trial 
counsel requested, as an alternative to mental health court, that Ms. Easley be placed 
on probation so she can attend the Jubilee House, a year-long treatment program. 
(01/31/12 Tr., p.44, L.22 - p.46, L.24.) In fact, trial counsel discussed Ms. Easley's 
substance addiction and mental health issues with staff at the Jubilee House and they 
said they have a positive track record with people who have issues similar to 
Ms. Easley's. (01/31/12 Tr., p.44, Ls.22 - p.45, L.13.) 
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Additionally, Ms. Easley's inability to meet the financial obligations of her 
probation was attributable to her mental health issues. Ms. Easley's most recent mental 
health evaluation concluded that her inability to maintain steady employment is largely 
attributable by her PTSD which was caused by her father's death. (PSI, pp.94, 98-99.) 
Finally, Ms. Easley's mental health issues are attributable to her substance 
addiction, which is at the heart of her legal problems. Her most recent substance 
addiction evaluation concluded that her mental health issues might inhibit the 
effectiveness of her substance addiction treatment. (PSI, p.119.) It went on to state 
that Ms. Easley's mental health issues need to be stabilized before she begins 
treatment for her addictions. (PSI, pp.119.) As part of the mental health court 
screening process, Ms. Easley received another mental health evaluation by Dr. Tyson, 
who stated that bi-polar disorder increases the odds of substance addiction. (PSI, 
p.125.) While Ms. Easley did have prior programming, none of that programming 
addressed her mental health in any meaningful manner. (01/31/12 Tr., p.41, L.24 -
p.42, L.6.) 
In sum, Ms. Easley suffers from severe mental health problems which the mental 
health evaluators concluded where at the heart of her legal, substance, and financial 
problems. These problems were the primary cause for her probation violations. Trial 
counsel contacted the Jubilee House and discussed Ms. Easley's unique situation, and 
the staff at the Jubilee House concluded that they could help Ms. Easley. In light of the 
foregoing information, the district court abused its discretion when it revoked probation 
because placement into the Jubilee House could meet the goals of probation. 
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v. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Further Reduce Ms. Easley's 
Sentences Sua Sponte Upon Revoking Probation 
Ms. Easley asserts that, given any view of the facts, her unified sentences of four 
years, with two years fixed, and seven years, with two years and six months fixed, are 
excessive. Due to the district court's power under I.C.R. 35 to reduce the length of the 
original sentence sua sponte upon the relinquishment of jurisdiction, on appeal an 
appellant can challenge the length of the sentence as being excessive. State v. 
McCarthy, 145 Idaho 397, 400 (Ct. App. 2008). Where a defendant contends that the 
sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will 
conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the 
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See 
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '''[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence.'" State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Ms. Easley does not allege that 
her sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse 
of discretion, Ms. Easley must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence 
was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria, or 
objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the 
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) 
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. 
There are various mitigating factors present in this matter which support the 
conclusion that Ms. Easley's sentence is excessively harsh. Specifically, Ms. Easley's 
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mental health is a mitigating factor. As argued in Section III, supra, Ms. Easley's mental 
health issues are at the heart of her substance addiction and her concomitant legal 
problems. Ms. Easley's mental health issues stem from the death of her father. (PSI, 
pp.101-104.) Ms. Easley has never fully recovered from her father's death which 
occurred when she was fourteen. (PSI, p.5.) Ms. Easley attended counseling after her 
father's death and suffers from depression and bi-polar disorder. (PSI, p.8.) In 2006, 
she was diagnosed with chronic PTSD and attempted suicide in 2008. (PSI, p.30.) In 
2010, Ms. Easley reported symptoms consistent with generalized anxiety disorder while 
participating in a substance addiction evaluation. (PSI, p.lO.) 
In addition to the emotional trauma Ms. Easley suffered from the death of her 
father, she has also been the victim of both sexual and physical abused inflicted by 
former boyfriends. (PSI, pp.6, 56.) Ms. Easley also scored in the high range of lifetime 
victimization during her 2010 substance addiction evaluation. (PSI, p.75.) 
Despite these setbacks, Ms. Easley has been capable of achieving some 
success in her life. For example, Ms. Easley has earned a GED and a certified nursing 
assistance certificate from the college of southern Idaho. (PSI, pp.6, 29.) Ms. Easley 
had full time employment when she was originally sentenced in the first case. (11/28/05 
Tr., p.21, Ls.14-15.) In 2007, Ms. Easley received a support letter from her employer at 
that time. (PSI, p.22.) The employer indicated that he was aware of her legal problems 
but was willing to continue her employment if she could serve her discretionary jail time 
on the weekends. (PSI, p.22.) 
Ms. Easley's family support is also a mitigating factor. Ms. Easley has a 
significant support system and her mother, sister, brother, and other people were 
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present to support her at the final probation violation disposition hearing. (01/31/12 
Tr., p.41, Ls.16-20.) 
In sum, Ms. Easley suffers from severe mental health problems which are at the 
root of her current legal problems. This is a significant mitigating factor because it 
reduces her culpability for her offenses and her probation violations. When this is 
viewed in light of the other mitigating factors present in this matter, it supports the 
conclusion that the district court abused its discretion when it failed to reduce her 
sentence sua sponte in the First Case and to further reduce her sentence sua sponte in 
the Second Case. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Easley respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and the 
opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise 
as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Ms. Easley respectfully 
requests that this Court remand this matter with instructions to consider placement into 
the Fifth Judicial District's mental health court. Alternatively, Ms. Easley respectfully 
requests that this Court remand this case with instructions to place her on probation. 
Alternatively, Ms. Easley respectfully requests that this Court reduce the length of the 
indeterminate portion of her sentences. Alternatively, Ms. Easley respectfully requests 
that this Court reduce the length of her sentences as it deems appropriate. 
DATED this 14th day of December, 2012. 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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